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• The inﬂation-targeting (IT) regime is 18 years
old and is now being practised in more than
21 countries, providing enough evidence to
assess the IT experience.
• This article analyzes the inﬂation record of IT
central banks by looking at a broad range of
factors that can inﬂuence deviations from the
inﬂation target.
• The author ﬁnds that part of the cross-country
and time variation in deviations of inﬂation
from target can be explained by exchange rate
movements, ﬁscal deﬁcits, and differences in
ﬁnancialsectordevelopment.Healsoﬁndsthat
a higher inﬂation target and a wider inﬂation-
control range are associated with more variable
outcomes for inﬂation and output.
• Although the literature tends to suggest that
greater central bank transparency is desirable,
these ﬁndings imply that transparency may
notimprovetheaccuracyofinﬂationtargeting.
Interestingly, central banks using economic
models to guide policy do a better job of
stabilizing inﬂation around the target and
output around trend.
ince inﬂation targeting (IT) was ﬁrst adopted
by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1990,
it has become an increasingly popular frame-
work for monetary policy.  It was adopted
by the Bank of Canada in 1991, followed by the Bank
of England in 1992. Since then, five other industrial-
ized countries and 13 emerging-market economies
have become inﬂation targeters, thereby providing
sufﬁcient evidence to assess the IT experience.
Inﬂation outcomes in the short run may be the result
of several factors other than monetary policy, especially
for small open economies like Canada’s. Nevertheless,
a successful IT central bank should, on average, be
able to keep inﬂation close to its target. In this article,
we analyze the performance of IT central banks in
achieving their target and assess the empirical role
of macroeconomic shocks, the financial environ-
ment, and the characteristics of the monetary policy
framework as determinants of this performance.1
In theory, we should expect more
transparent central banks to have a
better inﬂation record.
There is a general consensus among economists that
central bank transparency (i.e., the extent to which
information related to the policy-making process is
disclosed) is an important aspect of the monetary
policy framework. According to the International
Monetary Fund’s “Code of Good Practices on Trans-
parency in Monetary and Financial Policies” (1999) the
effectiveness of policy increases if the goals and instru-
1.  This article summarizes and updates Bank of Canada Working Paper
No. 2007–18 by Marc-André Gosselin (published under the same title).
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ments of policy are known to the public.2 If greater
effectiveness of policy is associated with higher trans-
parency, then, all else being equal, we should expect
more transparent central banks to have a better inflation
record. To verify this, we test the hypothesis that greater
central bank transparency reduces deviations from the
inﬂation target.
Using a panel of 21 IT countries over the period 1990Q1–
2007Q2, we ﬁnd that the ability of central banks to hit
their target varies considerably. Part of the cross-country
and time variation in performance can be explained
by exchange rate ﬂuctuations, ﬁscal deﬁcits, and dif-
ferences in ﬁnancial sector development. We also ﬁnd
that central banks opting for a higher numerical target
or a larger control range tend to observe larger inflation
deviations, while central banks using economic models
to guide policy do a better job of stabilizing inflation
aroundthetargetandoutputaroundtrend.Surprisingly,
regression results indicate that measures of transpar-
ency are either uncorrelated or positively correlated
with inﬂation and output deviations. These ﬁndings
could have practical applications. For instance, a bet-
ter understanding of the factors behind deviations
from the inﬂation target could be useful to central
banks debating the adoption of some form of IT. It
could also help IT countries to improve the design of
their monetary policy framework through learning
from the experience of successful IT central banks.
The Inﬂation-Targeting Experience
Although there is extensive literature on the economic
effects of having an inﬂation target, very few studies
examine the inﬂation performance of IT central banks.
Roger and Stone (2005) gather a number of stylized
facts on the international experience with IT. When
comparing actual and targeted inﬂation, they ﬁnd that
themeanabsolutedeviation(MAD)hastypicallybeen
about 1.8 percentage points (pp), and the deviations
vary considerably across country groups. There is a
greater dispersion of outcomes around inflation targets
in emerging-market economies than in developed
countries. Disinflating countries, on average, have
tended to exceed their target, while countries with a
stable target have tended to undershoot their target.
Like Roger and Stone, Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2004) examine various statistics on the extent to which
countries miss their inflation targets. They take the
analysis one step further, however, by performing a
2.  Jenkins (2004) and Kennedy (2008) also highlight the importance of trans-
parency in monetary policy making.
panel regression of inﬂation deviations. To control for
macroeconomic disturbances, Albagli and Schmidt-
Hebbel include deviations of the exchange rate from
its trend in their specification. They find that the higher
the numerical target and the wider the control range,
the more likely the inﬂation rate is to deviate from its
target. They also ﬁnd that deviations from target are
negatively correlated with central bank independence
and policy credibility (approximated with various
measures of country risk).
Central Bank Transparency: Theory,
Limits, and Evidence
Economists will generally argue that more information
is better. Having a central bank more fully communicate
its objectives, its assessment of economic conditions,
and the expected effects of its policy actions will enhance
social welfare, because agents will be better able to align
their decisions with those of the central bank and the
economy will adjust more smoothly. As Woodford
(2005) argues, monetary policy is more effective when
it is expected, since better information on the part of
financial markets about central bank actions and inten-
tions implies that the change in the policy rate required
to achieve the desired outcome can be much more
modest when expected future rates also move.3 Simi-
larly, Svensson (2005) notes that greater transparency
about central banks’ operational objectives (in the form
of an explicit intertemporal loss function), forecasts,
and communications would improve the conduct of
monetary policy. In principle, more transparent central
banks should thus have a better inflation record, all
else being equal, since greater transparency reduces
uncertainty about future policy actions. Using a small
analytical model, Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (2007)
show that the variance of inflation increases with the lack
of central bank transparency perceived by the public.
Greater transparency may not always lead to an
improvement in welfare, however. Morris and Shin
(2002) show that when the level of some variable
(e.g., potential output or fundamental asset prices)
is highly uncertain and the central bank is unlikely to
have better information than the private sector, disclo-
sure of the associated estimate may cause ﬁnancial
market participants to ignore their private information
and to coordinate on the noisy disclosed estimate,
leading to greater volatility. Similarly, using a model
where the actual and perceived degrees of transpar-
3.   It is private sector expectations of the entire future path of the policy rate
that matter for the economy. These expectations feed into longer-term interest
rates and asset prices, which affect private sector decisions.17 BANK OFCANADAREVIEW • WINTER 2007–2008
ency are allowed to differ from each other, Geraats
(2007) shows that the perception of opacity makes
financial markets more cautious in their response to
central bank communications, which may reduce the
volatility of private sector expectations. Cukierman
(2005) enumerates a number of cases in which the
optimal level of transparency is likely to be intermedi-
ate. For instance, it can be counterproductive for a
central bank to publish advance signals about poten-
tial problems in parts of the financial system. Such pub-
lication might induce a run on the banks or other
unpredictable movements that would force the central
bank to take more expansionary steps than if the
information were temporarily withheld. There
might also be a compelling case for keeping the dis-
cussions of the monetary policy committee secret
when there are disagreements within the committee.
Mishkin(2004)arguesthatannouncementofthecentral
bank’s objective function will complicate the commu-
nication process and weaken support for the central
bank’s focus on long-run objectives. In addition, some
forms of increased transparency may not be feasible.
Macklem (2005) points out that the complete state-
contingent monetary policy rule is too complex for a
central bank to derive or communicate anytime soon.4
The empirical literature on central bank transparency
often tries to identify the effects of a precise change in
disclosure practices by individual central banks on
speciﬁc economic or ﬁnancial variables. For instance,
Parent, Munroe, and Parker (2003) ﬁnd that the intro-
duction of a schedule of dates for policy interest rate
announcements increased the predictability of the
BankofCanada’sinterestratedecisionsandthefinancial
markets’ understanding of Canadian monetary policy.5
Chortareas,Stasavage,andSterne(2002)showthatthe
publication of more detailed central bank forecasts
reduces average inﬂation in a cross-section of 82 coun-
tries. Although most empirical studies conclude that
greater central bank transparency is beneﬁcial, their
primary limitation is that the ﬁndings for individual
4.   The state-contingent monetary policy rule represents the central bank's
optimal rule of conduct under all possible future contingencies for the direc-
tion the economy will take.
5.   Muller and Zelmer (1999) come to similar conclusions with respect to the
introduction of the Bank of Canada’s Monetary Policy Report in 1995.
Measuring Central Bank Transparency
Transparency is a qualitative concept for which few
precise measures exist. It is typically measured either
for a very limited number of central banks or at a single
point in time. Researchers usually look at three factors:
whether the central bank provides prompt public
explanations of its policy decisions; the frequency and
form of forward-looking analysis provided to the
public; and the frequency of bulletins, speeches, and
research papers.
Based on such information, Eijffinger and Geraats
(2006) construct comprehensive indexes that distin-
guish between ﬁve aspects of transparency relevant
for monetary policy making: political, economic, pro-
cedural, policy, and operational transparency. Among
the nine countries covered by the indexes, the most
transparent institutions are the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank, and the Bank of
England. The Bank of Canada ranks fourth.
Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) extend the indexes of
Eijffinger and Geraats, using a sample that covers
100 central banks for every year from 1998 to 2005.
Consistent with Eijffinger and Geraats, they find
that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish
Riksbank, and the Bank of England were the most
transparent central banks in 2005. The Bank of Canada
ranks ﬁfth, right behind the central bank of the Czech
Republic. They also find that the trend towards greater
transparency has been widespread, since no institution
has moved in the direction of less transparency over
this period.
Although these measures quantify the degree of
openness of central banks based on the information
provided, they do not necessarily reﬂect the extent to
which the public understandsthe monetaryauthority’s
actions and signals. Central bank transparency may
not be effective unless it can be appreciated by the
public and incorporated into its economic behaviour.
This issue motivated Kia and Patron (2004) to compute
a market-based transparency index. Their index uses
daily data on the federal funds and Treasury bill rates
over the period 1982–2003 and has the advantage of
reflecting whatmarketparticipantsunderstandfromthe
Federal Reserve’s actions and signals. Their deﬁnition
of transparency is much narrower, however, since it
only relates to day-to-day policy rate expectations.18 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2007–2008
realistic assumption, since targeting the midpoint of
the range maximizes the probability of keeping inﬂa-
tion within the band.7
The sample includes 21 IT economies: eight industri-
alized countries (Australia, Canada, Iceland, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom) and 13 emerging-marketeconomies (Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel,
the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines,
Poland, South Africa, and Thailand).8 Each country’s
inﬂation target, or target range, and regime starting
dates are taken from Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2007). For most countries, these data cover both a
declining inflation target period (i.e., disinflation) and a
period when the inflation target is stable. The sample
starts at various dates (depending on the individual
regimes) and ends in the second quarter of 2007.9
Theinﬂationperformanceofindustrializedeconomies
as a group is rather good, with about two-thirds of
target deviations smaller than 1 pp (Chart 1). There is
no bias overall, since 50.2 per cent of the deviations
are positive and 49.8 per cent are negative. Target
misses of more than 2 pp occur very rarely. The aver-
age of the MAD from the target is about 1 pp (Table 1).
Switzerland ranks ﬁrst, with inflation deviating from
the target by only 0.38 pp, on average. The United
Kingdom has a very good performance, with a MAD
of 0.66 pp. Canada comes third, with a MAD of 0.80 pp,
which means that, on average, inflation deviations
have been smaller than the 1 per cent band on either
side of the target. Iceland, with the most limited IT
experience among industrialized economies, is the
worst performer, with inﬂation missing the target by
2.13 pp, on average. Looking at the transparency rank-
ings (DE rank) of Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), there
is no obvious link between our MAD rankings and the
degree of transparency, which could suggest a weak
7. Paulin (2006) notes that, in practice, IT central banks tend to downplay the
role of the edges of the range, viewing them primarily as a communication
tool to provide clarity on the degree of tolerance with respect to the variance
of inﬂation. The Bank of England is an exception since, whenever the target is
missed by more than one percentage point, the Governor of the Bank must
write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining the reasons why inﬂation
has increased or fallen to such an extent and what the Bank proposes to do to
ensure that inﬂation returns to the target.
8. We did not include the euro area because the European Central Bank does
not consider itself an inﬂation targeter. Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004)
and Roger and Stone (2005) also exclude the euro area from their sample. The
Slovak Republic, Indonesia, Romania, and Turkey moved to IT in 2005–06.
9.   See Gosselin (2007) for details on the IT parameters, e.g., starting dates,
disinﬂation periods, numerical values, and deﬁnition of range.
cases cannot be easily generalized. Moreover, it is
difficult to identify the impact of increased transparency
on the basis of a time series when there may only be
one significant change in disclosure practices in the
sample period. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) over-
come these issues by constructing time-varying trans-
parency indexes for the majority of the world’s
central banks (see Box, p. 17). They find that trans-
parency has a broadly favourable, though relatively
weak, impact on inﬂation and output variability.
Although most empirical studies
conclude that greater central bank
transparency is beneﬁcial, their
primary limitation is that the




To analyze the inﬂation performance of central banks
under IT, we look at deviations of the rate of consumer
price inﬂation from targeted inﬂation (year-over-year,
quarterly). Although some central banks emphasize a
corerateofinflation,weusetotal inﬂation as measured
by the consumer price index (CPI), which is the most
widely understood and used measure of inﬂation and
is always used to deﬁne the ofﬁcial target variable.
Total CPI inflation does not abstract from the potential
effects of changes in indirect taxes on the recorded
inflation rate, however. This is a caveat to our measure
of performance, since short-run movements in inflation
caused by changes in indirect taxes are not an indica-
tor of monetary policy performance.6 This drawback
also applies to previous studies. For central banks
using a range for targeting inﬂation, the midpoint of
the band is used as the numerical objective. This is a
6.   Changes in indirect taxes can sometimes have a signiﬁcant impact on a
central bank’s ability to hit the target (Bank of Canada 1991). Nevertheless,
we use headline CPI because price series that account for the effect of changes
in indirect taxes are not readily available for the countries sampled. Yet we
were able to obtain CPI measures adjusted for the introduction of the Goods
and Services Tax for Australia and excluding the effect of changes in indirect
taxes in the case of Canada. If there were large effects of changes in indirect
taxes in the other countries in the sample, our performance rankings could be
biased in favour of Australia and Canada.19 BANK OFCANADAREVIEW • WINTER 2007–2008
correlation between inﬂation performance and trans-
parency.
As in Roger and Stone (2005), we find that central banks
tend to exceed their inﬂation target during disinﬂation
periods. Canada is an exception to this, however, with
inﬂation below the target by 1.06 pp, on average.10
10.   Excluding the effect of the tobacco tax reduction in 1994.
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This could reﬂect the Bank of Canada’s determination
to err on the side of tight monetary policy in the early
stages of IT.
There is very little bias around the target during stable
IT periods, especially in Australia, Canada, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom. Norway and Sweden have
tended to undershoot their objective, while Iceland is
the main overshooter. If we exclude Iceland, the average
bias falls from 0.82 to -0.07 pp and from 0.07 to -0.16 pp
during declining and stable IT periods, respectively.
The persistence of inﬂation deviations, as measured
by the half-life of a 1 pp deviation from the target, is
consistent with the typical impulse-response functions
from vector autoregression estimates. Deviations are
the least persistent in Norway and Switzerland
(half-life of 1.4 quarters) and the most persistent in
Sweden and Australia (half-life of 4 and 6 quarters,
respectively). Large target misses, measured by the
number of times that inflation diverged from the target
by more than 2 pp, never occurred in Switzerland and
the United Kingdom. They are more frequent in
Australia, New Zealand, and Iceland, which could
reﬂect a greater exposure to commodity-price shocks.
Although Canada might have been affected by such
shocks, it managed to record only four large target
misses. For countries using target bands, we also report
the number of times that inflation has been outside the
controlrangeduringperiodsofstableIT.Bythismetric,
Canada has the best performance among industrial-
ized countries, since inflation outcomes have been
beyond the edges of the target band in only 12 out of
46 quarters. The Australian performance is weaker,
Table 1
The Inﬂation-Targeting Performance of Industrialized Economies
IT MAD MAD DE Bias Bias Persistence Large Beyond
start (pp) rank rank (declining target) (stable target) (quarters) deviations bands
Australia 1994Q3 0.85 4 6 -0.05 5.97 7 29/52
Canada 1991Q1 0.80 3 4 -1.06 -0.02 2.91 4 12/46
Iceland 2001Q1 2.13 8 8 2.59 1.66 2.89 10 -
New Zealand 1990Q1 0.99 5 1 0.93 0.42 3.02 7 15/38
Norway 2001Q1 1.03 6 7 -0.56 1.40 4 -
Sweden 1995Q1 1.08 7 2 -0.85 3.95 5 24/50
Switzerland 2000Q1 0.38 1 5 -0.06 1.43 0 -
United Kingdom 1992Q1 0.66 2 3 0.02 2.78 0 -
Average - 0.99 - - 0.82 0.07 3.04 4.63 43%
Sources: Author’s calculations and Dincer and Eichengreen (DE) (2007)
Notes: MAD = mean absolute deviation of actual inﬂation from target; DE rank = transparency rankings in 2005 (industrialized IT countries only); bias = mean of
inﬂation deviations; persistence = half-life of a 1 percentage point (pp) inﬂation deviation (computed using autoregressive coefﬁcients); large deviations =
absolute inﬂation deviations greater than 2 pp; beyond bands = number of times that inﬂation is outside of the control range during stable IT periods20 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2007–2008
with year-over-year inﬂation outside of the range
more than half of the time.11
The performance of inﬂation-targeting regimes is rela-
tively weaker and much more dispersed in emerging-
market economies (Chart 2 and Table 2). Only 43 per
cent of deviations for the group lie between -1 and +1
pp, and about 33 per cent of deviations are larger than
2 pp. The average of the MAD is 0.86 pp higher than
for industrialized countries. The worst performers are
Brazil,Israel,andSouthAfrica,whileChile,theRepublic
of Korea, and Thailand have MADs comparable to
those for industrialized countries. Disinflation periods
are much more common in emerging-market econo-
mies. On average, there is a small negative bias
around the inﬂation target, but the ﬁgure is skewed
by the large undershooting in the Republic of Korea.
There are signiﬁcant cross-country differences, with
Brazil and Hungary both exceeding their target by an
average of 1.9 pp, and Colombia and the Republic of
Korea undershooting their targets by averages of 1.5
and 3.0 pp, respectively. Bias is smaller during stable
IT periods. The persistence of inflation deviations is
higher for emerging-market economies, with an aver-
age half-life of 3.83 quarters compared with 3.04
11.   Note, however, that the control range is narrower for Australia (between
2 and 3 per cent). Assuming a target band width comparable to that of the
other industrialized countries reduces the frequency of target-range misses
from 29 to 16 out of 52.
quarters for industrialized countries. Persistence is
particularly high for the Philippines and low in Peru.
Large inflation deviations are frequent, especially in
Brazil, Israel, and Poland. Although the control range
Chart 2
Distribution of Inﬂation Deviations from Target
Emerging-market economies
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The Inﬂation-Targeting Performance of Emerging-Market Economies
IT MAD MAD DE Bias Bias Persistence Large Beyond
start (pp) rank rank (declining target) (stable target) (quarters) deviations bands
Brazil 1999Q1 3.00 13 4 1.92 4.15 17 -
Chile 1991Q1 1.02 1 7 0.66 -0.27 2.05 8 6/26
Colombia 1999Q1 1.75 6 8 -1.53 4.59 14 -
Czech Republic 1998Q1 2.01 8 1 -0.95 2.34 14 -
Hungary 2001Q1 2.08 9 3 1.90 3.40 11 -
Israel 1992Q1 2.26 11 5 -1.14 -1.25 2.29 33 14/18
Korea, Republic of 1998Q1 1.16 2 5 -3.00 -0.03 3.99 6 15/30
Mexico 1999Q1 1.56 4 9 0.15 1.20 2.70 5 11/18
Peru 1994Q1 1.57 5 6 0.63 -0.67 1.16 13 10/22
Philippines 2001Q1 1.92 7 2 0.27 10.14 13 -
Poland 1998Q1 2.22 10 6 -1.13 -0.45 4.20 17 10/14
South Africa 2001Q1 2.31 12 4 0.61 4.18 10 12/26
Thailand 2000Q1 1.21 3 6 0.74 4.68 4 6/30
Average - 1.85 - - -0.20 -0.02 3.83 12.7 46%
Sources: Author’s calculations and Dincer and Eichengreen (DE) (2007)
Notes: MAD = mean absolute deviation of actual inﬂation from target; DE rank = transparency rankings in 2005 (emerging-market IT countries only); bias =
mean of inﬂation deviations; persistence = half-life of a 1 percentage point (pp) inﬂation deviation (computed using autoregressive coefﬁcients); large
deviations = absolute inﬂation deviations greater than 2 pp; beyond bands = number of times that inﬂation is outside of the control range during stable IT
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is generally larger, occasions when the target band is
missed are somewhat more prevalent, on average, in
these countries.
SwitzerlandandtheUnitedKingdom
obtain the best performance among
industrialized IT countries.
Putting these various performance metrics together,
it appears that Switzerland and the United Kingdom
obtain the best performance among IT countries.
Within the group of emerging-market IT countries,
Chile and Thailand have the best records. The magni-
tude, persistence, and frequency of inflation deviations
vary considerably across countries, perhaps because
of the diversity of exogenous economic shocks, insti-
tutions, and monetary policy frameworks that charac-
terize these economies. We will attempt to quantify the
contribution of these factors.
Empirical Determinants of
Deviations from the Inﬂation Target
We extend the work of Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2004) by examining a more extensive set of factors
that determine central bank performance under IT.
One of our contributions is to try to account for trans-
parency and other institutional measures speciﬁc to
central banks, which helps us to determine what makes
a successful IT central bank. As well, since the financial
system is a key component of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism, we also try to control for the
financial environment. Krause and Rioja (2006) ﬁnd
that a more highly developed financial system improves
the efﬁciency of monetary policy. Given this, we should
expect central banks’ success in hitting the inﬂation
target to increase with the degree of ﬁnancial market
sophistication.
We follow Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel and define
central bank performance under IT as the absolute value
of the difference between consumer price inﬂation
and either the target or the centre of the control band.
However, we broaden the deﬁnition of performance
by also considering speciﬁcations in which perform-
ance is measured as a weighted average of the absolute
value of deviations of inflation from the target and
of output from potential (i.e., the central bank’s loss
function). This is a reasonable exercise, since the
monetary policy objective typically includes not only
the stability of inﬂation around the target, but also the
stability of the real economy. Where a supply shock
shifts output and inflation in opposite directions, for
example, some central banks maybe willing totolerate
a one-time price-level movement rather than a distur-
bance in output.
Using the sample previously described, we regress
absolute inflation deviations (or the bank’s loss function)
on the characteristics of the monetary policy framework
andoncontrolvariablesrepresentingthemacroeconomy
and the ﬁnancial environment. The set of macroeco-
nomic control variables includes lags of the absolute
value of deviations of output, the exchange rate, and
the relative price of oil (all relative to their trend, as in
Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel). In addition to various
measures of country risk, we use the lagged fiscal deficit
relative to GDP to account for the dependence of
successful disinﬂations on ﬁscal reforms, especially in
emerging-market economies.12 Control variables repre-
senting the financial environment can be grouped into
those that capture the degree of financial market devel-
opment (index of financial market sophistication and
stock market capitalization, or turnover, relative to
GDP) and those that reflect the health of the banking
sector (e.g., indexes of bank financial soundness or
strength or market share of state-owned banks).
The characteristics of the monetary policy framework
can be grouped into three categories: IT parameters,
transparency, and other possible explanatory variables.
The first category includes the level of the inflation
target, the width of the target range, and the policy
horizon(i.e.,theperiodoverwhichinflationisexpected
to return to the target). Instead of trying to build
measures of central bank transparency such as those
described in the Box on p. 17, we use the indexes of
Dincer and Eichengreen (2007).13 We also experiment
separately with various proxies of the degree of
openness of monetary institutions in their communi-
cations with the public, such as the number of inflation
reports published per year, the provision of quantitative
12.   Since inﬂation in smaller and more open economies is likely to be more
exposed to foreign economic developments, we also try openness to trade
and country size as variables to explain deviations from the inﬂation target.
The macroeconomic control variables are lagged to avoid the issue of simulta-
neity.
13. We did not consider the measures of Kia and Patron (2004) and Eijfﬁnger
and Geraats (2006), since the former relies on daily data, making it virtually
impossible to reproduce for many countries, while the latter covers only nine
industrialized countries and does not vary over time.22 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2007–2008
forecasts, and the publication of minutes or voting
records of monetary policy committee (MPC) meet-
ings. These measures should exhibit enough variation
across time and countries to properly identify trans-
parency effects.14  Finally, although not directly
related to the concept of transparency, we investigate
the role of the frequency of official MPC meetings, the
use of economic models (with more than 10 equations)
to guide policy, the size of the MPC, and central bank
independence.15
Several estimation results based on various econometric
specifications, such as cross-section, pooled, and ﬁxed-
effects panel regressions, and regressions of instrumen-
tal variables, as well as a variety of deﬁnitions of the
central bank’s loss function, are reported in Gosselin
(2007).16 Table 3 summarizes and updates the main
empirical ﬁndings.
Among the macroeconomic control variables, we ﬁnd
that higher variability of the exchange rate and larger
fiscal deficits increase the magnitude of deviations
of inflation from the target. The statistical significance of
the exchange rate is not a surprise, given that most of
the countries in the sample are small open economies.
The output gap is statistically insignificant, consistent
with evidence of a flattening of the Phillips curve during
the 1990s. The insignificance of oil prices is more of a
surprise, however, especially given that we are looking
at total inﬂation.17 The various measures of country
risk examined by Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel are
not statistically signiﬁcant either, presumably because
this notion is already captured by other elements in
14.   For instance, the transparency indexes of Dincer and Eichengreen (2007)
take values of 6, 7, 7.5, 8, 9, and 9.5 for Switzerland, and 4, 4.5, and 5.5 for
Mexico.
15.   Some of the characteristics of the monetary policy framework exhibit
time variation, which allows us to introduce them in conjunction with
country-ﬁxed effects. For instance, the number of Monetary Policy Reports
per year published by the Bank of Canada changed from two to four in 2000.
As well, the dummy variable for the publication of minutes or voting records
of MPC meetings takes the value of 1 if and when this situation applies to a
central bank. Gosselin (2007) provides the exact deﬁnition and source of all
the explanatory variables that were considered potential determinants of
inﬂation-target deviations and the central bank’s loss function and reports
selected descriptive statistics of the variables representing the monetary
policy framework.
16.   While some speciﬁcations incorporate country-ﬁxed effects, we do not
control for a number of country-speciﬁc effects that may be quite important,
including: the weight of energy in the CPI basket times the elasticity
of domestic energy prices with respect to the world price of oil (which may
depend on taxes and regulation), the percentage of workers whose wages are
formally indexed to the CPI, and the basket weight of regulated prices that
are changed more than once a year.
17. A larger but barely statistically signiﬁcant impact of oil could be obtained
by multiplying the oil-price variable by a measure of how much oil the coun-
try uses.
the equation, such as the variable for the ﬁscal deﬁcit.
Regressions of the central bank’s loss function produce
similar results, except that lags of the absolute value of
the output gaparenowstatistically significant. Oil-price
deviations are positively correlated with loss, but the
impact is small.
There is no statistical evidence of a relationship between
central bank performance and the degree of ﬁnancial
market development. However, in line with Krause
and Rioja (2006), we find some evidence that the health
Table 3
Key Determinants of Central Bank Performance and
Their Correlation with Inﬂation Deviations or the




Output deviations ns +
Exchange rate deviations + +
Oil-price deviations ns +, small
Country risk premium ns ns
Fiscal deﬁcit/GDP + +
Financial environment variables
Degree of ﬁnancial market development
Financial market sophistication ns ns
Stock market capitalization/GDP ns ns
Stock market turnover/GDP ns ns
Banking-sector health
Soundness index of private banks - ns
Financial strength of private banks - ns
Market share of state-owned banks ns +, small
Institutional variables
IT parameters
Inﬂation-target level + +
Size of inﬂation-target range + +
Inﬂation-control horizon -, small ns
Transparency
Dincer and Eichengreen (DE) index ns ns
Number of inﬂation reports per year ns ns
Provision of quantitative forecasts ns ns
Publication of MPC minutes + +
Other
Frequency of ofﬁcial MPC meetings ns -, small
Use of models ns -
Size of MPC -, small ns
Central bank independence - ns
Notes: + and - indicate statistically signiﬁcant positive and negative coefﬁ-
cients; ns corresponds to insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients; small is added when
the effect is statistically signiﬁcant but economically small. The central
bank’s loss function is a weighted average of the absolute value of
deviations of inﬂation from the target and of output from potential.
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of the private banking sector is positively correlated
with meeting targets more consistently, since the
soundness and ﬁnancial strength of private banks are
both negatively correlated with inﬂation deviations.
The only control variable representing the ﬁnancial
environment that is statistically signiﬁcant in regres-
sions of loss is the market share of state-owned banks.
The coefﬁcient is positive, indicating that countries
with less development in the private banking sector
tend to have more variable output and inﬂation out-
comes relative to targets.
Several interesting ﬁndings concern the role played by
the characteristics of the monetary policy framework.
Consistent with Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel, we ﬁnd
that a higher value for the inﬂation target is associated
with larger deviations. The size of the control range
has the expected positive sign, presumably because
countries that deﬁne their targets in a less-restrictive
manner are more likely to deviate from the range’s
centre. Though by an economically small amount, a
longer inﬂation-control horizon reduces target misses,
which could suggest that by paying more attention to
longer-term objectives, the monetary authority is better
able to anchor the private sector’s expectations for
inflation.Surprisingly,thereisnostatisticalrelationship
between the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) transpar-
ency indexes and performance. This result could have
been expected, however, given the absence of correla-
tion between our MAD rankings and the transparency
rankings, as we saw in Table 1. With regard to our
transparency proxies, we do not find evidence of a
link between performance and either the number of
inﬂation reports published per year or the provision of
quantitative forecasts, which is contrary to the findings
of Chortareas, Stasavage, and Sterne (2002). Moreover,
we ﬁnd that central banks publishing the minutes or
voting records of their MPC meetings tend to miss their
objective by more than those that do not. This could be
because minutes and voting records sometimes expose
disagreements within the MPC, thereby complicating
communications with the public.18 Another explana-
tion for these ﬁndings could be that the requirement
for transparency may act as a constraint on policy by
18.   Another disadvantage of releasing minutes or voting records is that
knowledge by committee members that their positions and arguments will
become public information within a short period of time may inject short-
term political and personal career factors into their deliberations and voting
behaviour, which is likely to contaminate the monetary policy process with
considerations other than the public interest (Cukierman 2005). Similarly,
Kennedy (2008) argues that there is a need to protect the integrity of some
internal policy deliberations, since the public release of policy advice and pol-
icy recommendations could stiﬂe the free debate and consensus building that
is necessary for sound policy making.
reducing flexibility and introducing bureaucracy.
Central banks with larger MPCs have a slightly better
inflation performance, consistent with the principle that,
with some obvious limits, the greater the number of
board members, the broader the range of experiences
and perspectives, and hence the better their ability
to deal with uncertainty and to process information
(Berger, Nitsch, and Lybek 2006).19 We also ﬁnd that
independent central banks obtain signiﬁcantly better
inﬂation outcomes, which probably reﬂects a stronger
ability to commit to price stability (Cukierman, Webb,
and Neyapti 1992).
We obtain similar results with respect to the central
bank’s loss function. A higher level and a wider control
range for the inﬂation target are both associated with
larger monetary policy losses. The fact that the range
variable remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant
in the loss regressions suggests that the benefits of
lower output variance do not offset the costs of higher
inﬂation volatility when central banks choose a wider
control range. As with the regressions of inflation
deviations, the publication of minutes is harmful to
performance. Though by a small amount, we ﬁnd that
a greater frequency of ofﬁcial MPC meetings is associ-
ated with lower loss. This reduction could be the result
of better-timed policy decisions or transparency benefits,
in that more frequent meetings allow the central bank
to convey its view to the public with greater efﬁciency.
Finally, we find that central banks using models to guide
the conduct of policy obtain signiﬁcantly lower losses,
highlighting the importance of economic models in mak-
ing monetary policy (Coletti and Murchison 2002).
Conclusion
To recapitulate, our empirical analysis reveals that
inflation and output deviations are positively correlated
with exchange rate movements and fiscal deficits,
negatively correlated with private banking sector
health and central bank independence, and positively
or not correlated with transparency. Furthermore, we
find that deviations increase with the level of the
inﬂation target and the width of the control range but
decline if economic models are used to guide policy.
What makes a successful IT central bank? To minimize
deviations of inﬂation from target and of output from
trend, IT central banks would beneﬁt from having a
low numerical target and a relatively narrow control
range, conﬁdential MPC meetings, economic models
19.   We also experimented with squared transformations of some variables
to see whether there is an optimal level of transparency; the results were qual-
itatively similar.24 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2007–2008
to guide policy decisions, and independence from the
government.
Transparency may not improve the
accuracy of inﬂation targeting.
Our findings that transparency may not improve the
accuracy of inflation targeting should be interpreted
cautiously, however. Although the empirical results
suggest that greater transparency could reduce the
central bank’s ability to hit the inflation target, it is
important to keep in mind that central bank transpar-
ency is extremely difﬁcult to measure accurately. The
indexes used in this article attempt to measure and
quantify all the information provided to the public by
central banks, but do not necessarily reﬂect the extent
to which the public understands the monetary author-
ity’s actions and signals. Nor do they capture the degree
to which this information is incorporated into the
public’s economic behaviour. Therefore, given the
rudimentary nature of these indexes of transparency,
our results should be interpreted as preliminary until
better measures are obtained.
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